Volume 62
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 62,
1957-1958
1-1-1958

Cooling the "Hot Cargo" Contract
I. Herbert Rothenberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
I. H. Rothenberg, Cooling the "Hot Cargo" Contract, 62 DICK. L. REV. 135 (1958).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol62/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

COOLING THE "HOT CARGO" CONTRACT*
By I.

HERBERT ROTHENBERG

t

T

HERE are few, if any, departments of our jurisprudence which are so
delicately sensitive to the "realities" or so seismographically attuned to the
underfoot rumblings of the "practicalities" as is the branch of Labor Law.
Although each may ascribe his own reason therefor or view it with concern or
aplomb, according to his individual concepts, the law governing labor relations seems progressively to take on more and more the aspect of an unpredictable and constantly changing set of "ground rules" in a gladiatorial arena
rather than a code of peaceable and ethical human relations. While the rules
are applied, interpreted, literalized, generalized and metaphrased ' with, often,
considerable skill and technique, the fact remains that the rules themselves are
designed to channelize rather than to eliminate force or conflict.' There are
many who applaud the considered judgment of the Congress of the United
States in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act as a vehicle for at least ameliorating
certain of the more intolerable aspects of the then prevailing labor scene.
There are, however, many others who denounce the congressional action and
labor desperately to have the statute rescinded and to restore the very conditions which impelled the Congress to enact the law in the first instance.
Whether this statute will endure or be disemboweled, if not totally recalled,
depends entirely on a contest that is being waged in the political hippodrome.
* Editor's Note: A previous publication of this article appeared in 8 LABOR LAW JOURNAL 239
(April, 1957). This re-publication is with permission of the Commerce Clearing House, Inc. In
light of two recent decisions, the topic and the author's line of reasoning has taken on added
significance in the field of Labor Law. Teamsters of Atlanta v. Genuine Parts of Atlanta, 119
N.L.R.B. No. 53 (Nov. 8, 1957) ("Hot Cargo" contracts outlawed as to common carriers); Quaker
City Motor Parts Co. v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 148 F. Supp. 226 (E. D. Pa. 1957)
(Mandatory injunction decreed, requiring common carriers to deliver goods consigned to plaintiff,
notwithstanding that the employees of the carriers, due to their own personal preferences, were unwilling to cross a peaceful organizational picket line around the premises of the consignee, and despite
the existence of a "Hot Cargo" contract).
-I-Member of the Philadelphia Bar; Consultant to Bar on labor relations; Adjunct Professor
of Labor Law, Dickinson School of Law; Author of text: "Rothenberg on Labor Relations"; Contributor to numerous professional and lay periodicals.
United Packing House Workers v. N.L.R.B., 89 N.L.R.B. 310
1 For a few examples, see:
(1953) et 210 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954); Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955); N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n. v. N.L.R.B., 345 U.S. 100
(1953); Local 205, U.E.W. v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956); Office Employees
Int'l. v. N.L.R.B., 235 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Compare: Weber v. Annheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955) with Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Capital Service, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954) with
N.L.R.B. v. Swift & Co., 130 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Mo. 1955).
2 The Board may act upon violations of the Act, but neither the board, nor the Courts may
bar immoral or asocial conduct, nor even violence, which does not fall within the niceties of the
Act. International Union v. Wisconsin, 336 U.S. 245 (1949); N.L.R.B. v. International Rice
Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665 (1951).
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This, perhaps, is as it should be. Nevertheless, the fact remains -that it would
be naive or disingenuous to deny the interdependence between the rules of
labor law and the "realities" of the given moment and the whirling political
maelstrom.
To whatever degree this might be true in other fields of law, in no such
other sphere do the dynamics of external forces so irresistably control the
kinetics of the governing rules. It is impossible to point to any other area of
our jurisprudence where there is such a complex of contradictory rules and
regulations as is incessantly being promulgated, distinguished, refined and
rescinded by the hosts of courts, legislatures, boards and administrative bodies
and, often enough, the executive arms of both state and federal government.'
The only shape that may be discerned in this perplexing and formless pattern
is that the life expectancy of any prevailing rule or precept is coextensive only
with the prevailing "realities" or the continued incumbency of those who promulgated the particular rule. The interminable process of invention, refinement, distinction and rescission is so disquieting that even the most grizzled
practitioner of Labor Law is sometimes impelled to protest, like Alice, indignantly remonstrating with her Wonderland Queen of Hearts, "that is no rule;
you just made that up!".
While the peregrinations of both legislative, decisional and administrative
law (in such matters, to mention only a few, as the "Bonwit-Teller doctrine,""
the "authorization election," ' the "totality-of-conduct doctrine," I the "Morand
Brothers doctrine," " the disclaimer rules,8 the rules regulating the computation
3 Compare: N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955) with N.L.R.B. v.
Whitin Machine Co., 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 232 F.2d
158 (4th Cir. 1956) with N.L.R.B. v. Potlach Forests. Inc., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951); Local
205, U.E.W. v. General Electric Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956) with Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,
350 U. S. 198 (1956), Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956),
U.E.W. v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954), Amalgamated Assn. v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 193 F.2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1952); N.L.R.B. v. Goodman Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 465 (7th
Cir. 1955) and as revised in 234 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1956); Queen Mill Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320
(1950) with Southern Silk Mills, 116 N.L.R.B. 769 (1956); N.L.R.B. v, Cambria Clay Products,
229 F. 2d 433 (6th Cir. 1955) with B.V.D. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1412 (1954).
See, also Pa. State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, 386 Pa. 306, 125 A.2d 755 (1956).
' Bonwit-Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), Livingstone Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953);
Peerless Plywood Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953); U.S. Gypsum Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 734 (1956);
Qualiton, 115 N.L.R.B. 65 (1956).
5Sec. 9(e) (1-3) of L.M.R.A. (1947), and Taft-Humphrey Act of October 22, 1951, c. 534,
65 STAT. 601, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158, 159, 168, (Supp. 1954).
OReynolds Wire Co. v. N.L.R.B., 121 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1941); N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); Sec. 8(c) L.M.R.A., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
7 Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. N.L.R.B., 190 F. 2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), 91 N.L.R.B. 409
(1950), 204 F. 2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953), 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952); N.L.R.B. v. Truck Driver
Union, 231 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1956); Leonard v. N.L.R.B. 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953).
8 Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1948); William Lee Davis, 107 N.L.R.B. 1567
(1954); John F. Huback, 88 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1950); Riteway Motor Parts Corp., 115 N.L.R.B.
294 (1956).
See, particularly, the conflicting decisions of the respective Trial Examiners in the very recent
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of back pay,9 work registration," "cooling-off decisions," 1'"right-to-work"
legislation, jurisdictional fiat and a veritable host of other chameleon-like
rules) may generally seem rather startling to the novitiate in Labor Law and
somewhat inconsistent with the stability and constancy which obtains in most
other departments of the Law, to be sure one of the most unpredictable and
eccentric zones of Labor Law is in the area of secondary boycotts. Inasmuch
as the secondary boycott, by its very nature, results in either purposeful or consequential injury to innocent persons and those not involved in the primary
dispute, it would seem that morality and, certainly, a large segment of the
populace, 2 are opposed to the licensing by law of the secondary boycott, and
that at least in connection with such indefensible activities, the law would be
clear and firm.
Unfortunately, such is not the case.
tainly, no such firmness.

There is no such clarity and, cer-

Prior to the Wagner Act era, no one doubted that union activities which
struck at a disputant-employer by victimizing his innocent suppliers or other
faultless persons doing business with him, were beyond the pale of the law
and could and should properly and morally be prohibited. 8 The wrong seemed
plain and evident and the right of redress manifest. However, with and following the enactment of the Wagner (N.L.R.A.) Act a metamorphosis seemed
to have overtaken the fora of the Nation and it was concluded and reiterated
times too numerous to note that the secondary boycott, so lately and so surely
cases of International Union of Operating Engineers, Case No. 21-CB-805, decided November 6,
1956, and Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Case No. 5-CB-190, decided November 19,
1956, (neither of which have been passed upon by the Board as of this writing) wherein the present
General Counsel of the Board, in an effort to further have altered the Board's already partially
reversed position on the subject, contends that picketing for organizational purposes after employes
have rejected the union's claim of majority representation in a Board election constitutes a violation
of Section 8(b) (1) (A) as being coercive of the employes. Although the Board had several
times previously altered its position on the point, the farthest that the Board had hitherto gone was
that in certain comparable circumstances the claimed "organizational" picketing might constitute
"coercion" of employer-discrimination: Medford Building and Construction Trades Council of the
American Federation of Labor, 96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951).
9 N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953), reversing 196 F. 2d 424 (5th Cir.
1952); Shell Oil Co. v. N.L.R.B., 196 F. 2d 637 (5th Cir. 1952); F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
1OHarvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 320 (1950);
Southern Silk Mills, Inc.,
116 N.L.R.B. 769 (1956).
11 Local 3, United Packinghouse-Workers, CIO v. N.L.R.B., 210 F. 2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954);
Lion Oil Co. v. N.L.R.B., 221 F. 2d 231 (8th Cir. 1955).
1 See:
"Labors Dreaded Squeeze Play-The Secondary Boycott," READER'S DIGEST, Aug.
1948, p. 42.
"Secondary Boycotts-that is a sort of economic blackmail. No one can justify that type of
intrusion into the business relations of one concern with another": Robert N. Denham, former
General Counsel of the N.L.R.B., testifying before House Labor Committee on February 27,
1953.
I' Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Purvis v. Local 500, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 214 Pa. 348, 63 Atl. 585 (1906).
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illegal, had (somehow) become constitutionalized, and, as what would henceforth be considered as "free speech," was placed beyond the reach of the law-'
As a result of this newly-discovered constitutional exemption from restraint of
this species of activity the secondary boycott became a much used and abused
vehicle of "speech" and "persuasion." Even those quarters which still doubted
the legality and propriety of activities of this kind felt constrained by the prevailing conceptions to abstain from interfering with this "constitutionally proFor to think otherwise was archaic and "unrealistic." The
tected" right.'
secondary boycott thus became a lawful and immune weapon in the hands of
labor unions.
For almost fifteen years there were no means of curbing the activities of
those waging secondary boycotts, regardless of the damage which was thereby
inflicted upon innocent persons. This was said to be "unfortunate" and damnum absque injuria. At length, the situation became so rife and unequal that
it soon invited the attention of Congress which incorporated into the TaftHartley (L.M.R.A.) Act the so-called "secondary boycott" provisions which
are presently contained in the Act.16 In the very first cases under this Act,
these prohibitions against secondary activities were held to be constitutional,
and activities which so recently were discovered to be constitutionally protected
were again condemned. 7 Thus, a complete, if unsteadying, cycle was achieved.
As indicated previously, the "secondary boycott" was originally held to be
illegal. With the change in the political climate, it was suddenly discovered
and the view long persisted that it was the prohibition of secondary boycotts
that was unconstitutional and illegal and not the secondary boycott itself. With
the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the U. S. Supreme Court concluded that
some error had been made and that the secondary boycott was not such an exercise of the constitutionally endowed or protected right of free speech that it
could not be restrained by law; on the contrary, that Court now firmly held
that such prohibitory legislation was proper and enforceable. Joining in the
reversed procession several state courts which, in pre-Taft-Hartley days and
14 Taxi-Cab Drivers Local 889 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co., 123 F. 2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941);
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. Pauly Jail Bldg. Co., 118
F. 2d 615 (8th Cir. 1941); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 154 F. 2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946);
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Chester & Delaware Counties Bartenders Union, 361 Pa. 246,
64 A. 2d 834 (1949).
15Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
133 F. 2d 955 (7th Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. 2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939); Alliance
Auto Service, Inc., v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A. 2d 152 (1941).
16 Labor Management Relations Act section 8 (b)
(4) (A-D), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1952).
17 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675 (1951); Local
501, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Local 74, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707 (1951).
Compare the complained activities in these cases with those held not to be actionable in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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with great conviction, had also firmly ruled against the legality of anti-secondary boycott enactments, overruled themselves and held that in their present view
the constitution did not endow unions with this right of inflicting injury upon
innocent third-persons, and that to the extent that they had previously held
this to be the case, they had been in error.18
The secondary boycott takes numerous forms-namely direct secondary
picketing, products picketing, roving-situs picketing, local unfair listings, universal blacklists, etc., and may be directed at the disputant-employer's sources
of supply, production, sales, personnel, transportation or what have you. The
various manners in which a secondary boycott may be worked is limited only
by the guile and ingenuity of the minions and factoti of the union involved.
Whatever its form, the secondary boycott is designed to bring pressure upon
the primary employer by means of pressure and action against the innocent
secondary employer to terminate or withhold business relations, dealings, goods
or services from the primary employer. Although the ultimate object of such
activities is the economic isolation of the primary employer-a permissible
measure under present-day law-it is the achievement or the effort to accomplish this end by the means of inflicting damage or hurt upon the innocent
secondary employer that places the secondary boycott in the area of unlawful
and intolerable conduct.
One of the more favored means of effecting the secondary boycott is by
means of a "hot cargo" agreement. In the "hot cargo" provision the contracting employer agrees not to use or handle, nor to require his employees to use
or handle, goods which are not union made or which, for any reason, are proclaimed by the contracting union to be "unfair." Although, occasionally such
contracts are the products of collusion between the employer and the union
for the purpose of stifling competition or circumscribing markets," in the main
such provisions are unwanted by employers since through no fault of their
own they might under such contracts be compelled to surrender or forego
valuable markets or sources of supply. However, the unions, using the
same pressures by which they exact the remainder of the contract, compel the
employer, usually unwillingly, to subscribe to this provision and incorporate
it into the contract. The end object to be achieved by a "hot cargo" provision
in a contract is precisely the same as that which the union, in absence of such
18 Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Local 47, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers, (Texas) 285 S.W. 2d 942 (1956); Zeeman v. Amalgamated Retail
& Dep't Stores Employes, (Sup. Ct. Cal., Los Angeles County, No. 568, 644).
19 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S.
797 (1945); Davis Pleating and Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Association, 145
F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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contract, could achieve only by actual and culpable picketing of the secondary
employer. The advantages of shifting the burden of boycott, so to speak upon
the secondary employer by the simple expedient of a "hot cargo" clause are
patent. Nor are unions, adamantly insisting upon inclusion in the contract of
a "hot cargo" clause, unaware that no union has the means with which, by
picketing, to force into secondary boycott as many employers from whom the
same thing may be exacted by a simple (?) "hot cargo" clause. To this may
be added the advantage of enclosing the duty to boycott in an elegant facade
of contractual majesty. Although the "realities" usually disputes the contention, the argument becomes available to the union that the secondary employer's agreement to abstain from relations or dealings with the primary employer
is a voluntary undertaking and should be accorded the same dignity as any
other contractual obligation. As for the boycott itself, it is blandly argued
that this is not a secondary boycott at all but a purely contractual cessation of
intercourse which, as between the secondary and primary employer, is direct
and immediate rather than secondary, and, hence, is neither a secondary boycott
nor legally objectionable. The speciousness of this proposition should be selfevident. Apart from such interesting inquiries as to whether "hot cargo"
clauses are ever voluntary undertakings, it seems plain and evident that a union
which requires a third person not involved in the controversy to boycott the
primary disputant-employer is guilty of a secondary boycott. It is immaterial
that the third person's consent is extracted in advance or that it is achieved by
contractual contrivance. If a violation of the law is involved, it is neither
justification nor exoneration that the consent was elicited in anticipation of
the misdemeanor. Nor is there any persuasive reason why a secondary boycott
should be placed any further beyond the reach of the law than any other viola20
tion, merely because it receives mention in a contract.
It is interesting to note that, despite some popular notions to the contrary,
the Taft-Hartley Act does not prohibit "secondary boycotts" as such. This Act
nowhere mentions the term, nor does it in any manner seek to regulate any
20 Mere execution of a contract which violates the prohibition against unlawful discrimination
under section 158, Labor Relations Act 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C. § 158, constitutes an actionable cause: Otter Trawler's Union, 100 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1952); Pacific Maritime
Association, 89 N.L.R.B. 894 .(1950).
See, also Radio Offices Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954), wherein the Court held not
only that the unlawful activities of the union were not exculpated by reason of the existence of
sundry contractual provisions bearing on these activities, but that, as in other departments of law,
one is bound by the forseeable consequences of one's own acts, even though no violation was involved
at the particular or precise moment of the given act or the execution of the agreement.
However, see N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine and Office Association, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.
1955), wherein the court complicated the "natural and probable consequence" rule as it applies to
secondary boycotts by interposing a new distinction based on the presence or absence of knowledge
by the secondary employer of the primary employer's involvement in a labor dispute.
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species of activity of that express description.1
Hartley Act provides:

Section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft-

"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents .. "
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or selfemployed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer
or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or
to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the represe'ntative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as
the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9;
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the
provisions of section 9; (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular
trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in
another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an
order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work: Provided, That nothing contained in this
sub-section (b) shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person
to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own employer),
if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved
by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to
recognize under this Act;"
It will be observed that nowhere in this provision is the term "secondary
boycott" used. In dealing with "hot cargo" contracts, the tendency has been
to look to the Taft-Hartley Act for relief. Relief here is attended by considerable uncertainty, first, because of the labored phraseology and limitations
21 The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act expressly declares "secondary boycotts" to be an unfair
labor practice. The Act does not describe the particular activities which are prohibited as secondary boycotts, but contrariwise, uses the literal term "secondary boycott" in the prohibition. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 211.6 (1937).
The Act of 1947, June 30, P.L. 1160 § 1, amendment to paragraph (d) of this section, prohibiting the picketing of a place of employment by persons who are not employees of such place, was
declared unconstitutional interference with the right of free speech. Pa. Labor Relations Board v.
Chester and Delaware Counties Bartenders Union, 361 Pa. 246, 64 A.2d 834 (1949). However, this
decision was rendered prior to the case of N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trade
Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electric Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341
U.S. 694 (1951); Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707 (1951);
and the much quoted "trilogy" cases of International Brotherhood v. Hanke 339 U.S. 470 (1950);
Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Building Service Employees v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
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of the Act itself, and, secondly and no less important, the inconstancy and unpredictability of the Board's treatment of the entire subject of "hot cargo"
contracts.
The first significant case dealing with this subject under the provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act was that of Rabouin, d.b.a. Conway's Express Co.2"
In this case the employer in the labor dispute was a trucking company. In
order to whip the employer into submission, by severing his avenues of operation, the union invoked the "hot cargo" provisions in its agreements with
this employer's forwarding or transfer truckers, upon whose forwarding services the employer's business was dependent. Cut off and isolated as he was
by the union's enforcement of the "hot cargo" clauses in the labor contracts
of his cooperating truckers, the employer, contending that this was a boycott
within the meaning of the Taft-Hartley Act, sought relief from that National
Labor Relations Board. The then present membership of the Board held
that the so-called "secondary boycott" provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act were
inapplicable and that relief should therefore be denied. The Board, as well
as the court of review, predicated their respective decisions on grounds urged
by the boycotting union: (1) That the forwarding truckers were not "forced"
or "required" to cease doing business with the primary employer because they
had, by contract, voluntarily obligated themselves to do so; (2) that the
Union's demand for boycott was made to the management representatives of
the secondary employers and no direct inducement was made to the employees
themselves. On such premises the Board found that the complained activities
and the "hot cargo" clause did not fit the precise phraseology of the Act and
summarily dismissed the complaint. This curious decision and its tortured
rationale came as a shock to those who had followed the long and arduous
task of producing what had eventually emerged as the Taft-Hartley Act.
This smashing of one of the promises and hopes of relief which the Act held
forth in such cases was a sad disappointment. However, the Board and the
court had spoken and the law made. Some felt that a modicum of consolation derived from the implication of the Conway Express Co. case that relief
would at least be available if the union would dare to accost the secondary
employees themselves. There could be no way of denying relief in such
situations because this kind of boycott did fit even the most labored view of
the Act's phraseology.
Then came the Pittsburgh Plate Glass 3 case. The Board in this extraordinary decision held that the union had the right under a "hot cargo" agreeN.L.R.B. 972, enforced in 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).

2287
22
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ment to actually and directly induce the employees of the secondary employer
to refuse to handle the primary employer's goods, the Board ruling that the
refusal of the secondary employees to handle the primary employer's goods
was not a refusal "inthe course of employment", as required by the Act, since
the "hot cargo" clause of a contract removed the handling of such goods from
the course of employment. This anomalous doctrine remained the law of the
Taft-Hartley Act until the Sand Door and Plywood Co. 24 case. In this case
the secondary employer was a local building contractor whose employees were
installing doors which the contractor had purchased of a local supplier, who,
in turn, had purchased them from a Wisconsin company which was non-union.
The contractor was under contract with the union which subsequently waged
the boycott. The business agent of the union approached the contractor's
foreman, who was also a member of the union, and instructed him to stop
all installations of the doors in question on the particular job. The foreman
complied and shortly thereafter the local distributor who was supplying the
contractor with the doors in question filed a charge against the union. It was
at this point that circumstance interjected itself into the convolutions of law.
By the time hearings were completed in this case and the matter was
submitted to the Board for its consideration, the constituency of the Board
had changed somewhat. This Board, reversing the prior rules, by 3-2 action
found the union had committed an unfair labor practice. However, despite
the fact that the three members rendering the majority decision concurred
that an unfair labor practice was involved and that the two dissenting members were in accord that no unfair labor practice was involved, not a single
one of the five members could agree on the reasons for their respective holdings, not even the members who agreed that the prior rules of the Conway
Express Co. and Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. cases were inappropriate and
should be overruled. Of the dissenters, Member Peterson predicated his
dissenting opinion on the grounds that it was error for the Board to have
entertained the cause because of jurisdictional considerations. Dissenting
Member Murdoch, for substantive reasons, held that the union was not guilty
of the unfair labor practice of secondary boycott. Member Rodgers, held
that there was an unfair labor practice because the very clause in the contract
upon which the boycott was predicated was an illegal provision which contravened the policy of the Act. Chairman Farmer and Member Leedom, for
divergent reasons, held that while the "hot cargo" clause was not, per se,
illegal, the inducement of work stoppages of employees of a secondary employer was a violation of the Act and that such a violation could not be justified or excused by a contractual provision.
24

113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
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A comparison of the Sand Door case with its precursor cases of Conway
Express Co. and the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. will disclose the validity of
the original postulate as to the sensitivity of labor law to the vicissitudes of
circumstance, the external "realities", and administrative personnel. The
differently constituted Board which in an earlier and somewhat different
political environment, had decided the Conway Express Co. and Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. cases were firm and sure that the element of volition and consent involved in the execution of the "hot cargo" clause excluded boycott
activities pursuant to the contract from "the course of employment" of the
secondary employees. The Board as more lately constituted, was equally
firm and certain that such contracts did not have such exclusory effect and,
accordingly, reversed the Conway Express Co. case and Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. case pro tanto.25 While the Sand Door case established that a
direct inducement of the secondary employees to boycott the primary employer's goods constitutes a violation of the Act and cannot be justified or
excused by private contract,2" this decision left in doubt the basic question of
the intrinsic validity of the "hot cargo" clause itself. The Sand Door case
made it clear that a specific instruction of secondary employees not to handle
the primary employer's goods is a violation of the Act.
This rule, at least for the moment, is clear and unequivocal, but, precisely for that reason, not too much aid or solace may be derived therefrom
until the essential question of the legality of the clause itself is resolved because, in colloquial parlance, there are "more ways of killing a cat than choking it with butter". Not only is it extremely difficult, if at all possible, to
obtain from union members testimony that they were specifically instructed
by their union officials to participate in an illegal boycott, but it is unnecessary
for the union functionaries to take such risks or exercise such candor. Since,
even under the rule in the Sand Door case, a specific instruction not to handle
was the keystone of the decision, to circumvent this pre-condition of the Sand
Door rule, the union official need not "instruct or request" the union memberemployees not to handle the goods, but he need merely "inform" them of their
rights not to do so. There can be very little doubt as to what such "information" will produce. While no such case involving a "hot cargo" clause has
yet come before the Board, an analogy may be found in General Millwork
25 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. McAllister Transfer Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769
(1955), in which case, also in a split decision, each of the five board members disagreed on the
reasons for their respective holdings.
26 It is difficult to perceive why such strenuous labor was required to arrive at the decision that
parties cannot by private contract cancel out the remedial provision of the Act. It seems quite evident
that all attempts by the employer to do so have been summarily stricken down. See the cases
cited supra footnote 20.
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2 7 In this case
Corporation.
the business agent of the union had merely "informed" its members who were working for the secondary employer that it
was their right to refuse to handle the "non-union" doors which were being
installed at the particular project. Although there was no "hot cargo" provision involved, the union had a by-law which proscribed work by its members
on "non-union" products. With members Murdoch and Peterson dissenting
on all counts, the majority Board held that a violation of the Act was involved
since the purpose of the union agent in communicating the "information" to
his members as to their rights to abstain from handling the "non-union" goods
in question, was, in actuality, an inducement not to handle, and for this reason
came within the prohibition of the Act. By way of dictum, the majority members held that even if a "hot cargo" clause had been involved, the rule in the
case would have been the same. However, this was pure dictum.

Another void which the Sand Door decision did not fill relates to
the question of whether or not, in addition to the unlawful "inducement" by
the union agent, it is also essential that there be a "refusal to handle" on the
part of the secondary employees themselves. Suppose, for instance, the union
functionary "induced" the secondary employees not to handle the primary
employer's goods. In absence of a specific request by the secondary employer
upon his employees to handle the goods, it has been argued that the requisite
"refusal" is absence, the contention being that without the employer's
request
there can be no refusal by the employee. The Sand Door case did not decide
this point. Thus, this vacuum, augmented by the decision of at least two of
the majority members in the Sand Door decision that the "hot cargo" clause
is not, per se, illegal or a violation of the Act, the Sand Door decision, by
indirection, has practically legalized the inducement of secondary employees
not to handle the primary employer's goods even though such "inducement"
is in violation of the Act. Under the vacancies left by the Sand Door case,
only additional proof of a "refusal" by the employees to handle, which is to
say, additional proof that the employer affirmatively demanded of his employees that they handle such goods, would make out an actionable case. In
an effort to bridge the chasm, the Board, in a very recent decision, that of
Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, 8 held that no express or voiced refusal
is required to constitute the union's inducement as a violation of the Act. In
this connection the Board said: "A refusal can consist of a failure to perform
regularly assigned work". 9 Although the negative aspect of the problem
113 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1955).
116 N.L.R.B. (No. 195) (October 25, 1956).
29 See the case of Meier & Pohlman Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S.
-,
1 L.ed 2d 80 (1956), which was an appeal from an injunction
action based on an alleged conspiracy to boycott the plaintiff in violation of the Motor Carriers Act.
27
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received the Board's attention in the Milk Drivers case, the more important
question of the conditioning of the Act's operation upon whether the secondary
employer makes an express demand upon his employees was not answered.
This writer is not aware of any other department of law wherein a concededly
illegal act is considered as irremediable unless there is an accompanying request by the aggrieved person upon the malfeasor to desist from the wrongful
act.
Another void which was left by the Sand Door and McCallister Transfer
cases arose from the failure of the Board to explicitly rule on the contention
that if "management", as contrasted to "employees", were "induced" to abstain from handling the primary employers goods, then, notwithstanding the
otherwise unlawful "inducement or encouragement", the cause would not be
actionable because the provisions of the Act require that the "inducement" or
"encouragement" be of "employees". In the Conway Express case the "inducement" was made to persons who were concededly "representatives of
management" or "supervisors". The Board, in consequence of this circumstance, held that all other considerations apart, there was no violation of the
Act because there was no "inducement or encouragement" of "employees".
In the Sand Door case the "information" was communicated to a foreman of
the secondary employer, which foreman was also a member of the particular
union. The question in this case was whether the foreman was an "employee"
or a representative of "management". Although there was a dissent by the
minority members, the majority held that the foreman, in communicating the
information to the "employees" was acting as a representative or agent of
the union and not of the employer, and, hence, in communicating the "information" to the member-employees, the foreman was, in effect, the union "inThe union, which caused the employees of the other carriers to refuse to handle the plaintiff's goods,
had "hot cargo" contracts with the secondary employers, the other carriers. In dismissing the action,
the court, among other things, held that merely "informing" secondary employees of their rights
not to handle the primary employer's goods, does not constitute "inducement" or "encouragement"
not to handle, and, moreover, that even if there is "refusal" by the member-secondary employees
to handle, this refusal is not a violation of the Act, because "the prohibition does not extend to the
individual members of such organizations or to the employer", notwithstanding that such refusal
is produced by the union's communication of "information" of the member-employee's right not
to handle. It is interesting to note that in this case the court took full notice of the vagaries of the
"hot cargo" rule through the Conway's Express Co., McCallister Transfer, and Sand Door cases,
supra, but refused to adjudicate the conflicts between the cases or to make a decision as to which
of the conflicting rules was most valid.
See also the case of Davis Pleating & Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Association,
145 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1956), wherein the court held that no violation of the Federal AntiTrust Laws were involved where a group of employers, pursuant to a "hot cargo" provision in their
contract, refused in concert to supply goods to an employer engaged in a controversy with the contracting 'union, the court holding that under the case of Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
325 U.S. 797 (1945), no such concerted action between the union and employers was an actionable
conspiracy under the Anti-Trust Laws unless the concerted action was for the benefit of an "outsider" and nor for purposes of self-help to the union.
However, see Madden v. General Teamsters, Etc., Local No. 126, 141 F. Supp. 459 (1956).
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ducing" employees. The Sand Door decision did nothing more, in this regard, than to determine an individual fact in the particular case. It did not
resolve the fundamental principles of law involved.
In Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. N.L.R.B., ° the court went a short way
in the direction of resolving this basic issue. In this case' the union, without
benefit of any "hot cargo" agreement, endeavored to persuade the "buyers"
of chain stores and markets which were the customers of an abbatoir whose
employees the union was endeavoring to "organize". In contending that the
provisions of the Act were not applicable in this case, the union, among other
things, argued: first, that since only one buyer of each secondary employer
was solicited to boycott the abbatoir and its products, the Act did not apply
because the prohibition embraced in the Act is directed against the inducement
of "employees". The court made short shrift of this contention, holding that
the plural in the Act included the singular. The union's more serious contention was that the buyers of the various secondary employers performed
managerial functions and, hence, were agents of the employer and that, accordingly, the prohibition of "inducement" of employees were not relevant or
operative in the premises. The court rejected the contention, holding that the
term "any employee", against the inducement of boycott by whom the Act
operates, means any employee except such specifically excluded individuals
as supervisors and the like. It was then held that while the buyers in question were "agents" of the employer since they were not supervisors and not
excluded as such, their status as "agents" for management did not take them
outside of the subject of the Act's prohibition. Accordingly, the Board's
cease and desist order was enforced.
The Amalgamated case is another step in the direction of clarification
of the enormous confusion and vaccilation which attends the "hot cargo"
situation. However, it, like all of the prior decisions, falls far short of rectifying the basic evil at which the anti-boycott provision of the Act was plainly
pointed. Even, if at length, the Act should be held to apply to all species of
boycotts of secondary employees, even then the decisions, and, indeed, the
Act would fall far short of redressing the evils which the Act was theoretically
designed to redress. Even if the decisions and the Act completely and on all
counts barred such inducement of "employees", the principal evil of secondary
boycotts would still be immune inasmuch as all that would be required of
the union to escape the rigors of the Act would be to "put the pressure" directly on supervisors or immediate management itself rather than by having
the employees carry the program forward. To be sure, such cuteness or eva30
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sion is not the cure which Congress intended. As first indicated at the beginning of this article, it was the evil of secondary boycotts, per se, at which
the Act was directed. If, under the Act, the basic evil may not be attacked
and remedied, it would seem, then, that there exists adequate means in law
to deal with the "hot cargo" contract without resort to the Act. Indeed, in
many cases which are foursquare within the Act and remediable by the Board,
the redress or relief comes too late to "relieve". Because of the protracted
nature of Board proceedings and the reluctance of the Board to apply to the
courts for collateral injunctive assistance, very often a business enterprise can
be extinguished by the practices and violations of the law which are subsequently prohibited by the Board. Unfortunately, a cease and desist order,
nor, in truth, an order of enforcement, will resuscitate a business which has
been assassinated. It is submitted that more direct and more immediate relief is indicated, and, at least in one aspect of the problem, is available under
the law even as it is presently viewed.
Inasmuch as under the case of Garner v. Teamsters "' state jurisdiction is
not excluded where the complained activity is not comprehended by the TaftHartley Act, under the growing, if somewhat uncertain, interpretations of the
Taft-Hartley Act, "hot cargo" provisions which are enforced or implemented
by solicitation of the proprietors of the secondary businesses or their supervisory personnel, are not embraced by the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Accordingly, the Garner case does not bar state relief in such situations. Several questions present themselves in connection with the prospect of obtaining
state relief against the enforcement of "hot cargo" clauses in this fashion.
The first is that of the legality or illegality of the "hot cargo" clause under
the provisions of the state law. In most jurisdictions, the secondary boycott
was uniformly held to be illegal in the pre-Wagner Act days.
As observed in the earlier portion of this article, there was an interval
of exaltation of such contracts in the era intervening between the promulgation of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. Since the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have
clearly established that prohibitions of the secondary boycott, whether by judicial or legislative action, is not an unconstitutional interference with the
right of free speech. 2 Accordingly, the error of the judicial assumption during the interval between the Wagner and the Taft-Hartley Acts that the constitution elevated the secondary boycott above prohibition is now clear. If
31 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
32N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1951); United Brotherhood
of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707 (1951).
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the constitution does not bar the federal Government from prohibiting the
immoral and unfair secondary boycott, it seems evident that the constitution
does not bar the state authorities, judicial or legislative, from doing so in the
exercise of the state police powers, particularly where the state law does not
impinge upon areas in which the federal legislation operates. From this,
then, it follows that the pre-Wagner Act prohibitions of the secondary boycott, in whatever form they may then have existed, unless since properly
rescinded by law, are existing and enforceable prohibitions of the present time.
If such activities were enjoinable under the state law prior to the Wagner Act,
it seems perfectly clear and obvious that no constitutional bar exists to the
present day enforcement of those self-same prohibitions.
The final objection which presents itself to the present day enforcement
of long existing state prohibitions of secondary boycotts, is the consideration
of the bar of intervening anti-injunction statutes. If no state anti-injunction
act is on the books, then it is plain that no impediment exists to state relief
of "hot cargo" clauses (or other species of secondary boycotts which are not
within the purview of the Taft-Hartley Act). It must not, however, be supposed that the presence of a state anti-injunction act precludes such relief.
Union activities which are for an object which is proscribed by law, considered
as being for an illegal object or purpose, do not constitute a lawful "labor
dispute" and may be enjoined notwithstanding the existence of an anti-injunction act, which uniformly excludes injunctive relief only in cognizable
"labor disputes". A secondary boycott, if it is unlawful under the law of
the state, constitutes an unlawful act and not a lawful "labor dispute", and,
subject to the particular provisions of a given state anti-injunction act should
be enjoinable under state law without relation or impediment of the federal
statutes. Moreover, if the complained activities are, under the state law
unlawful, they are tortious and, it has been held by the Supreme Court,"3 actionable in the state courts for damages. Thus, until such times as the Board,
Congress and the federal courts disperse the bewildering smog of cant and
indecision in which the purposes of the Taft-Hartley Act have become lost,
the more frequent and effective utilization of the means which many states
render available for that purpose will do much to cool off the "hot cargo"
contract.
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